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The integration of the agricultural and energy sectors caused by rapid growth in the biofuels market signals 
a new era in food policy and sustainable development. For the first time in decades, agricultural commodity 
markets could experience a sustained increase in prices, breaking the long-term price decline that has ben-
efited food consumers worldwide. Whether this transition occurs—and how it will affect global hunger and 
poverty—remain to be seen. Will food markets begin to track the volatile energy market in terms of price 
and availability? Will changes in agricultural commodity markets benefit net food producers and raise farm 
incomes in poor countries? How will biofuels-induced changes in agricultural commodity markets affect net 
consumers of food? At risk are more than 800 million food-insecure people—mostly in rural areas and depen-
dent to some extent on agriculture for incomes—who live on less than $1 per day and spend the majority of 
their incomes on food.1 An additional 2–2.5 billion people living on $1 to $2 per day are also at risk, as rising 
commodity prices could pull them swiftly into a food-insecure state.
The potential impact of a large global expansion of biofuels production capacity on net food producers 
and consumers in low-income countries presents challenges for food policy planners and raises the question 
of whether sustainable development targets at a more general level can be reached.2 Achieving the 2015 
Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000, which include 
halving the world’s undernourished and impoverished, lies at the core of global initiatives to improve human 
well-being and equity,3 yet today, virtually no progress has been made toward achieving the dual goals of 
alleviating global hunger and poverty. The record varies on a regional basis: Gains have been made in many 
Asia-Pacific and Latin American-Caribbean countries, but progress has been mixed in South Asia, and set-
backs have occurred in numerous sub-Saharan African countries.4 Whether the biofuels boom will move 
extremely poor countries closer to or further from the Millennium Development Goals remains uncertain.
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Biofuels growth also will influence 
efforts to meet two sets of longer-run 
development targets.5 The first encom-
passes the goals of a “sustainability 
transition,” articulated by the Board on 
Sustainable Development of the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences, which 
seeks to provide energy, materials, and 
information to meet the needs of a global 
population of 8–10 billion by 2050, while 
reducing hunger and poverty and pre-
serving the planet’s environmental life-
support systems. The second is the Great 
Transition of the Global Scenario Group, 
convened by the Stockholm Environ-
ment Institute, which focuses specifically 
on reductions in hunger and greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions beyond 2050. As 
additional demands are placed on the 
agricultural resource base for fuel pro-
duction, will ecosystem services (such 
as hydrologic balances, biodiversity, and 
soil quality) that support agricultural 
activities be eroded? Will biofuels devel-
opment require a large expansion of crop 
area, which would involve conversion of 
marginal land, rainforest, and wetlands 
to arable land? And what will be the net 
effect of biofuels expansion on global 
climate change?
Although the questions outnumber the 
answers at this stage, two trends seem 
clear: total energy use will continue to 
escalate as incomes rise in both industrial 
and developing countries, and biofuels 
will remain a critical energy development 
target in many parts of the world if petro-
leum prices exceed $55–60 per barrel. 
Even if petroleum prices dip, policy sup-
port for biofuels as a means of boosting 
rural incomes in several key countries will 
likely generate continued expansion of 
biofuels production capacity. These trends 
will have widespread ripple effects on 
food security—defined here as the ability 
of all people at all times to have access to 
affordable food and nutrition for a healthy 
life—and on the environment at local, 
regional, and global scales. The ripple 
effects will be either positive or negative 
depending on the country in question and 
policies in play.
Overriding Engel’s Law
The increasing use of food and feed 
crops for fuel is altering the fundamental 
economic dynamics that have governed 
global agricultural markets for the past 
century. Investments in crop-based bio-
fuels production are rising steadily as 
countries seek substitutes for high-priced 
petroleum products, GHG-emitting fos-
sil fuels, and energy supplies originat-
ing from politically unstable countries.6
While both energy and food demand rise 
with income growth, the rate of increase 
is much greater for energy (see Figure 1 
on this page). Declining marginal demand 
for food in the aggregate with income 
growth—a pattern widely referred to by 
the economic development community as 
Engel’s Law—coupled with impressive 
increases in world food production have 
led to a steady decline in real food prices 
over the past century.7 To date, Engel’s 
Law has withstood various purported 
challenges, such as the emergence of 
China and India into the global economy, 
the world’s rising wealth, and the rapidly 
expanding demand for meat worldwide.
The same pattern does not hold for 
energy prices, however, which have oscil-
lated significantly in past decades and 
increased in real (inflation-adjusted) 
terms since the mid-1990s (see Figure 2 
on page 33). It is clear that until recently, 
real prices for food and petroleum have 
not moved systematically in the same 
direction. But if energy markets begin to 
determine the value of agricultural com-
modities, the long-term trend of declining 
real prices for most agricultural com-
modities could be reversed and Engel’s 
Law overridden. Over the short term, this 
reversal, while helping net food producers 
in poor areas, could have substantial con-
sequences for the world’s food-insecure, 
especially those who consume foods that 
are direct or indirect substitutes for biofu-
els feedstocks. Moreover, fuel prices have 
generally been more volatile than staple 
commodity prices (as seen in Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Global per capita cereal and energy 
consumption versus per capita income for 2003–2004
NOTE: Cereal consumption includes cereal consumed directly and feed 
grains fed to livestock.
SOURCE: Energy and income data from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 2007 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007); cereal data from 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT, 
http://faostat.fao.org.
P
er
 c
ap
ita
 e
ne
rg
y 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
in
 k
ilo
gr
am
s 
of
 o
il 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
;
P
er
 c
ap
ita
 c
er
ea
l c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
in
 k
ilo
gr
am
s
Per capita income (in U.S. dollars)
energy consumption
cereal consumption
NOVEMBER 2007 ENVIRONMENT 33
For example, crude oil prices have been 
roughly twice as variable as global maize 
prices over the last 35 years based on the 
coefficient of variation. Food price vola-
tility has the largest impact on extremely 
poor households, who typically spend 
55–75 percent of their income on food.8
Energy-Agriculture Price 
Linkages
Assessing the potential impact of bio-
fuels expansion on global food security 
requires a sense of which crops, which 
regions, and what types of demand- 
supply substitutions are most sensitive 
to the convergence of energy and agri-
culture. Because crop-based biofuels 
are used predominantly for motor fuels, 
regions with large endemic food insecu-
rity will likely not be substantial sources 
of biofuels demand or supply in the near 
term, with a few important exceptions 
discussed below. Also, conversion of non-
food cellulosic crops to biofuels will 
likely account for only a small proportion 
of total biofuels production over the next 
10 years—and maybe longer (see the 
box on page 34). Hence, global biofuels 
production capacity will largely depend 
on the use of food and feed crops. Based 
on these assumptions, the primary effect 
of biofuels development on food secu-
rity over the next decade will likely be 
through movements in international food 
prices induced by activities in middle- and 
high-income countries. The energy yield 
of crops is an important determinant of 
future biofuels development patterns (see 
the box on page 36). Production costs 
and returns, as well as market integration 
between biofuels and fossil fuels, are also 
fundamental determinants of agro-energy 
price linkages.
The transmission of energy prices to 
agricultural markets has traditionally 
been viewed in terms of energy inputs 
to agriculture (such as fertilizer, mecha-
nization, and transportation). Now the 
relationship is determined by the “parity 
price” between crops and fossil fuels (also 
referred to as the “break-even price”), 
defined as the price at which the revenues 
from crop-based biofuels production are 
sufficient to cover production costs.9 Sev-
eral basic models have been developed to 
project the transmission of energy prices 
to agricultural markets.10 The models 
show that once differences in energy con-
tent are accounted for (for example, a liter 
of ethanol contains roughly two-thirds the 
energy of a liter of gasoline), the ethanol 
price should equal the gasoline price, 
which itself closely tracks the price of 
petroleum. The same holds for biodiesel 
and diesel fuel. 
Price Transmission in the 
International Market
Although the relationship between 
energy and agricultural commodity prices 
is fairly well understood, the transmission 
Figure 2. Global trends in prices of food commodities and crude oil 1970–2007
NOTE: Crude prices are international averages.
SOURCE: Historical data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/. Futures 
data from Chicago Board of Trade, http://cbot.com; and http://tradingcharts.com.
Long-run trends in inflation-corrected prices Trends in nominal prices since January 2005 with 
futures prices for maize and crude for December 
2007 and 2008
in
de
xe
d,
 2
0
0
0
=
1
in
de
xe
d,
 2
0
0
0
=
1
34 ENVIRONMENT VOLUME 49 NUMBER 9
of agricultural prices from major biofuels-
producing and consuming nations to the 
international market—and to local mar-
kets in food-deficit countries—is less cer-
tain. There are several good qualitative 
models for global agricultural price trans-
mission effects, and some limited quanti-
tative models.11 Here we present a basic 
analytical framework for conceptualizing 
price transmission dynamics and describe 
the potential effects on both commodity 
markets and the environment for four 
major players in the biofuels market: the 
United States, Brazil, China, and Indone-
sia. These countries were selected on the 
basis of their roles in global production, 
exports, imports, and potential expansion 
of production in five key commodities: 
maize, cassava, sugar cane, soy, and oil 
palm. The United States and Brazil com-
bined account for more than 90 percent 
of global bio-ethanol production. China 
is the third largest bio-ethanol producer, 
and Indonesia is quickly becoming the 
biggest oil palm producer globally.
The effects of crop-based biofuels on 
food prices can be traced through direct and 
indirect dynamics of production and con-
sumption (see the box on page 38). These 
dynamics include the responsiveness of 
demand and supply for the relevant agricul-
tural commodities to prices, which depends 
in large part on the substitution possibilities 
in production and consumption (for food, 
feed, and fuel); the ability of countries to 
expand land area and raise yields for biofu-
els feedstocks; market integration between 
the biofuels and fossil fuels markets; and 
border and domestic policy incentives on 
biofuels and feedstock production and con-
sumption, such as those promoted in the 
current U.S. energy and farm bills. The 
short- and long-run effects may differ sub-
stantially depending on the biophysical 
sustainability of individual crop production 
systems. The long-run effects will also be a 
function of changing incomes, tastes, bio-
fuels research and development, and infra-
structure investments. Finally, in addition 
to market price dynamics, potential non-
market costs and benefits to society from 
expansion of biofuels production capacity 
include changes in native species’ habitat, 
biodiversity, air and water quality, and net 
GHG emissions. 
U.S. Maize Production for 
Domestic Bio-ethanol 
The United States accounts 
for roughly 40 percent of world 
maize production (see the table 
in the box on page 36) and 
typically contributes 55–60 
percent of total global trade in 
maize.12 As a result, the amount 
of maize grown in the United 
States, and the share of maize 
used for domestic consump-
tion versus exports, has sig-
nificant impact on international 
maize prices. 
The sustained high price of 
petroleum in recent years, trans-
lating directly into high gasoline 
prices, has provided impetus for 
growth in the domestic maize bio-
ethanol industry. Combined with 
policy incentives that include a 
$0.13 per liter ($0.51 per gallon) 
blending credit for ethanol, a 
$0.14 per liter ($0.54 per gallon) 
tariff on imported ethanol, a 2.5 
percent additional duty on the 
value of imported ethanol, and 
a mandate to phase out MTBE 
(methyl tertiary-butyl ether) 
as a fuel additive (ethanol is a 
good substitute for MTBE), the 
domestic industry is expanding 
rapidly. Annual production of 
U.S. bio-ethanol was 18.5 bil-
Second-generation biofuels from ligno-cellulosic biomass (such as forestry and crop residues, 
corn stover, and switchgrass) are widely regarded as preferred feedstock for biofuel produc-
tion because the vast abundance of biomass crops could support a larger biofuel industry 
than can be supported by food crops alone.1 However, current cellulosic biomass-to-fuel 
conversion processes are still under development, and large-scale harvesting, storage, and 
refinery systems are not yet cost-effective. Several companies operate pilot-scale facilities and 
will develop small commercial-scale biorefineries for wood chips, prairie grasses, and crop 
residues within two to three years.2 But even those sources of feedstock are becoming more 
expensive. Rapid expansion of maize bio-ethanol from grain has raised the price of potential 
feedstock sources, such as hay and forage crops; for example, the price of maize crop residue 
used for cattle and dairy feed has doubled in Nebraska during the past year.
Cellulosic biomass is composed of sugar polymers that can be broken down and fermented 
into ethanol; however, because it provides the structural rigidity for plants and trees, it has 
evolved to be highly resistant to degradation from predatory organisms.3 Enzymes are being 
developed for ligno-cellulose degradation, but their conversion efficiency is limited and their 
cost is currently too high for large-scale commercialization. Water requirements for large-scale 
cellulosic ethanol conversion and infrastructure costs also are not well understood but could be 
significantly higher than for maize bio-ethanol according to some expert estimates.4 Biomass 
can also be converted to biodiesel via thermochemical processes—thereby avoiding some of 
the constraints to the large-scale deployment of cellulosic ethanol—but production remains at 
a pilot scale.5 Due to these current constraints, observers predict that mature technology for 
large-scale deployment of cellulosic biofuels production is at least 10 years away.6 During this 
10-year period, biofuels production capacity based on food crops will continue to expand at 
a rapid pace.
1. For some analysis of cellulosic biofuels, see M. K. Heiman and B. D. Solomon, “Fueling U.S. Transportation: The 
Hydrogen Economy and Its Alternatives,” Environment 49, no. 8 (October 2007): 10–25.
2. B. Hahn-Hagerdal et al., “Bio-ethanol: The Fuel of Tomorrow from the Residues of Today,” Trends in Biotechnol-
ogy 24, no. 12 (December 2006): 549–56.
3. M. E. Himmel et al., “Biomass Recalcitrance: Engineering Plants and Enzymes for Biofuels Production,” Science 
315, no. 5813 (9 February 2007): 804–7.
4. M. M. Wright and R. C. Brown, “Comparative Economics of Biorefineries Based on the Biochemical and Ther-
mochemical Platforms,” Biofuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining 1, no. 1 (September 2007): 49–56.
5. G. W. Huber, S. Iborra, and A. Corma, “Synthesis of Transportation Fuels from Biomass: Chemistry, Catalysts, 
and Engineering,” Chemical Reviews 106, no. 9 (2006): 4044–98. 
6. M. E. Himmel et al., note 3 above.
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lion liters in 2006, surpassing Brazil (at 
17 billion liters) for the first time. U.S. 
output is expected to reach 30 billion 
liters by the end of 2007 and 45 billion 
liters by the end of 2009. Although the 
2006 bio-ethanol output accounts for only 
2.5 percent of the country’s 530 billion 
liter annual gasoline consumption on an 
equivalent energy basis, it is transforming 
the agricultural sector.
In response to this rapid increase in 
ethanol production capacity, maize prices 
rose from $2.60 per bushel in July 2006 
to $4.25 per bushel at the start of planting 
in March 2007.13 The high price caused 
acreage planted to maize in 2007 to rise 
19 percent over 2006 plantings to almost 
38 million hectares.14 This was the largest 
area planted to maize since 1944. Most 
of this expansion came at the cost of 
soybean plantings; soy acreage declined 
15 percent from a record high in 2006 to 
about 26 million hectares in 2007. Acre-
age planted to wheat rose 6 percent to 
about 24 million hectares due to higher 
prices caused by global supply shortages 
and increased livestock demand. Perhaps 
most striking has been the massive appre-
ciation in agricultural land values. The 
average price of U.S. farmland increased 
74 percent between 2000 and 2007 to a 
record $4,700 per hectare. In Iowa—a 
leading maize-producing state—farmland 
values rose by roughly $2,470 per hectare 
between 2003 and 2007 to more than 
$7,900 per hectare.15 
What these changes mean for U.S. 
maize plantings and international maize 
prices over the longer run remains uncer-
tain. Maize prices fell in mid-July 2007 to 
$3.55 per bushel due to increased supply, 
but futures prices for December 2008 
are still about $4.00 per bushel indicat-
ing the strength of expected demand.16 
Future demand for maize bio-ethanol will 
depend importantly on consumer prefer-
ences, flex-fuel fleet expansion, and infra-
structure investments. Investments have 
already been made in nearly a hundred 
new bio-ethanol plants throughout the 
country, paving the road for continued 
growth in the industry. Moreover, strong 
policy support for maize bio-ethanol, 
driven in large part by the underlying 
goals of boosting rural incomes in lead-
ing farm states and reducing foreign oil 
imports, will likely bolster future demand 
for maize.
The real limitation is likely to be on 
the supply side. Assuming that maize area 
remains at 38 million hectares with trend-
line yield growth, about one-third of the 
maize crop would be needed for ethanol 
production in 2010, up from 17 percent in 
2006. The United States is fundamentally 
constrained in how much maize can be 
produced for bio-ethanol by both land 
area and yield potential. Although maize 
area expanded this year at the cost of 
other crops, such as soy, price feedbacks 
(as described in the box on page 38) limit 
the amount of area substitution that will 
occur over time. For example, the poten-
tial for a further shift of additional soy-
bean area to maize is likely to be small, 
if any, because soybean prices have also 
risen to record levels due to the reduction 
in soybean area in 2007. Some agricul-
tural lands that were previously removed 
from production for programs like the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) are 
now being brought back into maize culti-
vation. CRP is at a critical juncture with 
roughly 400,000 contracts on 11.3 million 
hectares (24 million acres) scheduled to 
expire between 2007 and 2010.17 In the 
2007 Farm Bill, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) is proposing to 
give priority on re-authorization of CRP 
contracts to whole-field enrollment for 
lands used for biomass production or 
energy (mainly cellulosic feedstocks).18 
Unless such biomass systems include a 
diverse mixture of perennial crop species, 
introducing monocultures into CRP lands 
will likely have adverse effects on bio-
diversity and wildlife habitat—two main 
CRP goals. 
The yield potential for U.S. maize is also 
limited, despite some private sector claims 
to the contrary. Maize yield increases will 
likely remain on their current trajectory of 
about 1.8 bushels per acre per year (0.113 
tons per hectare per year) even with cur-
rent efforts to improve maize hybrids 
by the major seed companies. Because 
farmers will be motivated to achieve high 
yields in response to high maize prices, 
they are likely to apply greater amounts 
of inputs, especially fertilizers, since the 
ratio of maize price to fertilizer cost has 
increased. Although potentially beneficial 
for yields, greater fertilizer inputs can also 
have negative implications for nitrogen 
and phosphorous loss to groundwater, 
surface water, and the atmosphere (for 
example, nitrous oxide, a potent GHG, 
and regional nitrogen oxide (NOX) pollu-
tion) unless farmers also modify methods 
of fertilizer application to achieve greater 
efficiency and smaller losses. 
Chinese Cassava Imports for 
Domestic Bio-ethanol 
China presents an interesting case for 
analyzing the sustainability of biofuel 
systems because the country is the most 
rapidly growing consumer of transpor-
tation fuels in the world market, is the 
Rising demand for ethanol is causing expansion of maize acres in the United States.
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largest contributor of GHG emissions 
(recently surpassing the United States), 
and is highly constrained in terms of land 
resources for food and feedstock produc-
tion.19 Bio-ethanol production in China’s 
officially sanctioned plants during the past 
3–5 years has been around 1.3 billion 
liters. One pro-biofuels faction of the 
government has argued for ambitious bio-
ethanol targets of up to 6.3 billion liters 
by 2012, with 50 percent of the country’s 
motor fuel containing 10 percent ethanol.
There also has been a strong reaction 
by a separate government faction to rising 
cereal prices in 2007, however, and to the 
prospects of allocating a significant share 
of China’s crops to energy production. 
More than 85 percent of the bio-ethanol 
produced prior to 2006 has used maize, 
rice, and cassava as feedstocks.20
An ambitious biofuels program would 
very likely raise China’s demand for 
staple food imports—a potential shift 
that makes the government increasingly 
concerned over the domestic food secu-
rity implications of biofuels growth. As a 
result, China’s top leaders implemented a 
new policy in 2007 that prevents crop pro-
duction for bio-ethanol on land tradition-
ally devoted to staple grain production. 
Instead, minor crops, such as cassava, 
sweet potato, and sweet sorghum that 
are grown on marginal soils outside the 
primary grain belt are being encouraged 
for use as feedstocks. Of all the non-grain 
bio-ethanol resources, sweet sorghum is 
a favorite among agricultural experts due 
to its low cost and ability to grow on 
marginal land.21 The government aims to 
produce 3.8 million tons of bio-ethanol 
annually from sweet sorghum stalks.22
This amount translates into 4.8 billion 
liters of ethanol—almost one-third of 
Brazil’s 2005 production.
Will China be a major bio-ethanol 
feedstock producer in the future with the 
ban on maize, wheat, and other staple 
crops in place? The answer depends in 
large part on the availability of non-tradi-
tional feedstocks, and hence on marginal 
land for crop production. China currently 
feeds more than one-fifth of the world’s 
population on only 7 percent of the global 
cultivated land area.23 The country’s total 
arable land is around 130 million hect-
ares, most of which has been used during 
the past 50 years to meet food demand. 
Internal official reports suggest that an 
additional 116 million hectares of mar-
ginal land exists—mainly in the south-
First-generation biofuels are produced from conversion of plant 
starch, sugars, oils, and animal fats into an energy source that 
can be used in combustion engines to replace gasoline and diesel 
fuel derived from petroleum. Currently, bio-ethanol is the most 
widely used biofuel and acts as a substitute for (or is blended 
with) gasoline. It is produced by fermentation from a number of 
crops, including sugarcane, maize, cassava, wheat, sugar beet, and 
sweet sorghum. Biodiesel, widely used in Europe, is made from 
extracted vegetable oil using crops such as rapeseed, soybean, 
oil palm, and sunflower. As of 2005, leading bio-ethanol produc-
ing countries include Brazil (16.5 gigaliters per year), the United 
States (16.2), China (2.0), the European Union (1.0), and India 
(0.3).1 Major biodiesel producers include Germany (1.9 gigaliters 
per year), France (0.5), the United States (0.3), and Italy (0.2). 
Among the major feedstock crops, biofuel energy yield (giga-
joules per hectare) is greatest for Malaysian palm oil and smallest 
for Brazilian soybean with a 10-fold difference between the two 
based on current crop yields and processing yields (see the table 
at right). On average, the energy yield per hectare from Malaysian 
oil palm was 1.4-fold greater than the energy yield from Brazil-
ian sugarcane, 2-fold greater than U.S. maize, 4-fold greater than 
Brazilian cassava.2 It should be noted, however, that these figures 
represent gross biofuel energy yields; they do not account for 
energy expended in the cultivation, harvesting, and processing of 
the crops, which would reduce their net energy yields.
Because biofuels recycle atmospheric carbon dioxide, they 
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to petroleum 
fuels; however, fossil fuel energy inputs used in the biofuel produc-
tion lifecycle lower the GHG mitigation potential of biofuels. After 
accounting for energy inputs, Brazilian sugarcane bio-ethanol 
has the greatest net GHG mitigation potential and is estimated to 
reduce GHG emissions by approximately 100 percent compared 
to gasoline on an energy-equivalent basis.3 Maize bio-ethanol, soy-
bean biodiesel, and cassava bio-ethanol have been shown to reduce 
net GHG emissions compared to gasoline by similar amounts: 
13–52 percent, 41 percent, and 40 percent respectively.4 The GHG 
mitigation potential of oil palm biodiesel could be as high as sug-
arcane bio-ethanol for established plantations, but forest clearing 
for new plantation establishment, particularly by burning, could 
release stored carbon and lead to significant net increases in GHG 
emissions relative to petroleum use.5
1. Worldwatch Institute, Biofuels for Transportation: Global Potential and Impli-
cations for Sustainable Agriculture and Energy in the 21st Century (Washington, 
DC, 2006).
2. A. E. Farrell et al., “Ethanol Can Contribute to Energy and Environmental 
Goals,” Science 311, no. 506 (27 January 2006): 506–8; I. Macedo, M. Lima Verde, 
and J. Azevedo, Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Production and 
Use of Fuel Ethanol in Brazil, Government of the State of São Paulo and Secretariat 
of the Environment (São Paulo, Brazil, 2004); T. L. T. Nguyen, S. H. Gheewala, and 
S. Garivait, “Full Chain Energy Analysis of Fuel Ethanol from Cassava in Thailand,” 
Environmental Science & Technology 41, no. 11 (2007): 4135–42; and J. Hill et 
al., “Environmental, Economic, and Energetic Costs and Benefits of Biodiesel and 
Ethanol Biofuels,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103, no. 30 
(2006): 11206–10.
3. Macedo, Lima Verde, and Azevedo, note 2 above.
4. Farrell et al., note 2 above; M. Wang, M. Wu, H. Huo, “Life-cycle Energy 
and Greenhouse Gas Emission Impacts of Different Corn Ethanol Plant Types” 
Environmental Research Letters 2 (2007): 024001; Hill et al., note 2 above; Z. Hu et 
al., “Economics, Environment, and Energy Life Cycle Assessment of Automobiles 
Fueled by Bio-ethanol Blends in China,” Renewable Energy 29, no. 14 (2004): 
2183–92.
5. M. B. Wahid, C. K. Weng, C. Y. May, and C. M. Chin, “The Need to Reduce 
National Greenhouse Emissions: Oil Palm Industry’s Role,” Journal of Oil Palm 
Research special issue (2006): 1–23.
ENERGY YIELDS AND GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION 
POTENTIAL OF LEADING BIOFUELS 
NOVEMBER 2007 ENVIRONMENT 37
west—and that roughly 20 percent (23 
million hectares) of this land is biophysi-
cally suitable for feedstock production. 
Although possible, it is doubtful that such 
vast tracts of land would be suitable for 
crop-based feedstock production, particu-
larly since much of the area is on sloping 
land prone to serious erosion. 
Large areas of marginal land have 
also been put into the Grain for Green 
Program (China’s version of the Conser-
vation Reserve Program), and the govern-
ment is committed to preventing this land 
from being planted in row crops. The 
environmental costs of converting vast 
areas of marginal land to crop production 
are only beginning to be explored. More-
over, the economic feasibility of develop-
ing these areas for feedstock production 
is debatable since the unskilled wage 
is rising, which could make the costs 
of cultivating and transporting nontradi-
tional crops—all labor-intensive activi-
ties—prohibitively expensive. 
As a result of these constraints, China is 
looking for feedstock production oppor-
tunities outside its borders. Some internal 
reports suggest that the China Oil and 
Food Corporation is investing in several 
Southeast Asian countries (Laos, Cambo-
Agricultural production of five major feedstocks and biofuel energy yields
Biofuel type Bio-ethanol Biodiesel
Biofuel crop Maize Sugarcane Cassava Soybean Oil Palm
Country, top two  
crop producers in 2005
United 
States
China Brazil India Nigeria Brazil
United 
States
Brazil Malaysia Indonesia
Total productiona 2005, in 
million metric tonnes
280 133 420 232 42 26 83 50 76 64
Percentage of world  
production,a 2005 
40 19 33 18 20 12 39 24 44 37
Average crop yield,a 
2003–2005, in  
metric tonnes per hectare
9.4 5.0 73.5 60.7 10.8 13.6 2.7 2.4 20.6 17.8
Conversion yieldb in liters 
per metric ton
399 399 74.5 74.5 137 137 205 205 230 230
Biofuel yieldc in liters per 
hectare
3751 1995 5476 4522 1480 1863 552 491 4736 4092
Energy yieldd in  
gigajoules per hectare
79.1 41.1 116 95.4 31.2 39.3 18.2 16.1 156 135
2005 petroleum  
replacement,e percent of 
total petroleum use
2.0 2.4 40.4 1.8 - - 0.1 - - -
a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT, http://faostat.fao.org/ (accessed 4 August 2007).
b  Feedstock conversion yields for maize: H. Shapouri and P. Gallagher, 2002 Ethanol Cost-of-Production Survey, USDA-ERS, AER 
no. 841 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, Office of the Chief Economist, Office of Energy Policy and New 
Uses, 2005), http://www.usda.gov/oce/reports/energy/USDA_2002_ETHANOL.pdf (accessed 25 September 2006); sugarcane:  
J. Goldemberg, “Ethanol for a Sustainable Energy Future,” Science 315, no. 5813 (9 February 2007): 808–10; cassava: Nguyen et 
al., note 2 at left; soybean: Hill et al., note 2 at left; oil palm: calculated, 20 percent of harvested mass is crude oil, 1:1 conversion 
of crude palm oil-to-biodiesel (Dr. Ma Ah Ngan, Malaysian Palm Oil Board, in personal communication with the authors, September 
2006). Palm oil density is 0.87 kilograms per liter.
c Biofuel yield = crop yield x conversion yield.
d  Gross energy yield; lower heating value of ethanol 21.1 megajoules per liter or biodiesel 32.9 megajoules per liter x conversion yield x 
crop yield. 
e  Biofuel production capacity converted to energy-equivalents of gasoline (or diesel). Petroleum replacement based on gasoline and 
diesel use in 2003 for each respective country. Worldwatch Institute, note 1 at left; and Energy Information Administration, Interna-
tional Energy Annual 2004, DOE/EIA-0384 (Washington, DC, 2005).
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dia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines) for biofuels feedstock production; 
it already leases hundreds of hectares in 
Laos for cassava production. There also 
is speculation that the company is buy-
ing property in the Philippines to plant 
oil palm. These arrangements—if they 
come to fruition—will have wide-ranging 
implications for rural incomes, employ-
ment, trade, and the environment for the 
participating countries.
From a global food security perspec-
tive, the largest impact of China’s activi-
ties might be seen through the interna-
tional cassava market. In the past, cassava 
has been traded internationally in small 
volumes, mainly for feed, and subject to a 
peculiar set of EU trade policies.24 World 
trade in cassava has risen recently to 8–10 
percent of global production, reflecting 
China’s entrance into the world mar-
ket for livestock feed and biofuel feed-
stocks. China’s cassava imports account 
for roughly two-thirds of total world trade 
and now stand at 12.5 million metric tons 
annually, up from 2 million metric tons 
in 2000.25 Virtually all these imports are 
sourced from Southeast Asia, with Thai-
land as the largest world exporter (and 
re-exporter). If China’s cassava demand 
continues to increase in the international 
market, it is expected that cassava prices 
will rise significantly. Will the interna-
tional livestock sector or the world’s poor 
be more vulnerable to the expected price 
increase? Understanding the ripple effects 
of China’s demand on poor net consumers 
and producers of cassava in regions as 
distant as Sub-Saharan Africa will require 
further analyses.
Expansion of Brazilian 
Sugarcane and Soy 
Brazil has been the world’s largest pro-
ducer and consumer of bio-ethanol for the 
past 25 years and has only recently been 
surpassed by the United States. The coun-
try is currently the only major exporter 
of bio-ethanol. Strong government sup-
port and a tropical/subtropical climate to 
which sugarcane is well adapted make 
Brazil’s the world’s most technologi-
cally sophisticated, energy-efficient, and 
market-integrated biofuels industry.26
Sugarcane bio-ethanol now accounts for 
40 percent of automobile motor fuel in 
the country and requires about 54 percent 
of the sugarcane crop. Overall, Brazil 
accounts for one-third of global sugarcane 
production, which is produced on 5.6 
million hectares, or about 10 percent of 
the country’s total existing cropland. With 
rapidly growing internal and export mar-
kets for ethanol, there are now plans to 
expand production by adding another 136 
bio-ethanol plants to the existing stock of 
357 facilities.27
In comparison to the United States 
and China, expansion of Brazilian bio-
fuels production is significantly less 
constrained by land. Over the next 10 
years, sugarcane-cropped area is esti-
mated to reach roughly 10 million hect-
Large-scale biofuels expansion will alter prices of staple food crops through direct 
and indirect channels, as illustrated by the hypothetical example of maize bio-ethanol 
in the United States (see the figure below). Rapid growth in maize bio-ethanol leads 
to price increases in maize, wheat, and soy in the absence of significant yield growth 
or crop area expansion. The ripple effects are seen in pristine land areas cleared for 
agriculture (for example, conservation land in the United States or rainforests in Bra-
zil), on the livestock sector, and on consumers of these staple food commodities. The 
magnitude of effects depends on adjustments in grain, oilseed, and livestock markets, 
and on price transmission domestically and internationally.
DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS 
OF BIOFUELS EXPANSION
NOTE: D = demand curve; S = supply curve. 
Rising demand for maize leads to 
growth in supply along the curve 
that includes production a higher 
marginal costs.
Longer-run shift in supply due 
to technical change induced by 
higher prices.
Greater area sown to maize 
reduces area planted to soy, 
causing soy prices to rise.
Dynamics of a biofuels-induced increase in demand 
for maize, wheat, and soybeans in the United States
Higher maize prices increase 
demand for wheat in livestock 
markets, causing wheat prices 
to rise.
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ares.28 Although current production is 
primarily localized in the southern state 
of São Paolo, the anticipated expansion 
will likely displace livestock pastures and 
other crops, thus indirectly raising distant 
Amazon deforestation.29
Soybean cultivation in Brazil for feed 
and biodiesel poses a more direct threat 
to the Amazonian rainforest in the central 
state of Mato Grasso.30 Soybean expan-
sion has moved northward over the last 30 
years and is projected by some to reduce 
the Amazonian rainforest by 40 percent 
by 2050.31 Although livestock expansion 
has historically been the main cause of 
Amazon deforestation, soybean plant-
ing often follows livestock pastures and 
more recently has been a direct cause 
of deforestation.32 The savannahs of the 
Brazilian cerrado and the Chaco forest 
of Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia are 
similarly threatened by crop expansion.33 
The cerrado is experiencing dramatic loss 
of 2.2–3 million hectares of native habitat 
per year. If soybean prices stay high as a 
result of the large shift of U.S. soybean 
area to maize and increased demand for 
biodiesel production, there could be a new 
burst of soybean expansion into the Ama-
zon rainforest and cerrado. The expansion 
of both sugarcane and soybean will thus 
have a significant impact on biodiversity 
and, through deforestation, the release of 
carbon stored in forest biomass and soil.34 
Soil nutrient and hydrological balances 
within the Amazonian basin are also likely 
to change at a regional scale, raising ques-
tions about the sustainability of cropping 
systems in the region over the long run.
Indonesian Oil Palms for 
Global Biodiesel
The production of oil palm in Indo-
nesia for biodiesel raises many of the 
same issues as the Brazil case. Dubbed 
“green gold,” Indonesian oil palm yields 
a phenomenal 17.8 tons per hectare and 
presently commands a price of more than 
US$750 per ton.35 Though Malaysian 
yields are higher on average, Indonesia 
benefits from abundant land resources and 
lower wages. Production costs in Indone-
sia are around $185 per hectare, compared 
to $226 per hectare for Malaysian palm 
oil.36 As a result, Indonesia is expected to 
overtake Malaysia in 2007 as the world’s 
largest palm oil exporter.
As the cheapest vegetable oil source 
in the global market, palm oil is ide-
ally suited as a biodiesel feedstock. Both 
Indonesia and Malaysia have previously 
made large commitments to the industry, 
each having agreed to use 6 million met-
ric tons of palm oil (about 40 percent of 
total output) for biodiesel production.37 
Ultimately, the relative prices of crude 
and vegetable oil, along with subsidy 
and trade policies in the United States 
and European Union, will determine the 
size of Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s export 
markets and, in turn, the magnitude of 
investments in oil palm plantations.
Environmental and social justice con-
cerns threaten to limit palm oil’s market 
potential. Federal plans, including one 
to convert 5 million hectares of central 
Borneo rainforest to oil palm, typically 
do not include environmental audits or 
satisfactory mechanisms for resolving 
land conflicts. Even plans that are care-
fully conceived at the federal level may 
be overridden at the local level. Decen-
tralization of government authority in 
Indonesia from the federal to provincial 
levels has created confusing and conflict-
ing land-use plans and legal structures 
and has led to many disputes—some-
times violent—with local inhabitants. 
Moreover, the volume of palm oil needed 
to meet a biodiesel refinery’s profit-
ability criteria favors large-scale, ver-
tically integrated companies. Fitting 
smallholders into biodiesel production 
systems is a challenge for Indonesian 
policymakers.
The most serious environmental prob-
lems stem from converting rainforests 
to oil palm plantations.38 Despite laws 
to the contrary, land is often cleared by 
fire, resulting in regional air pollution 
and a substantial release of carbon from 
standing biomass and soil, particularly 
when peat areas are converted. Forest 
conversion also destroys critical habitats 
for endangered orangutans and a tremen-
dous array of other species.39 Moreover, 
palm oil mill effluents pollute waterways, 
further damaging native species’ (and 
human) habitat. In response to these prob-
lems, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil—a group of major producers and 
international and local nongovernmental 
organizations—was initiated in August 
2003 to help resolve issues of land tenure 
and environmentally destructive manage-
ment practices.40 This process has created 
an essential dialogue and a set of guiding 
principles, although smallholder produc-
ers remain underrepresented.
DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS  
OF BIOFUELS EXPANSION
The supply of food grains that will make it all the way to markets such as this one in 
Ecuador will depend on the global crop demands of the alternative fuel industry. 
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An additional challenge for policy-
makers is the effect of rising palm oil 
prices on poor households. Speculation 
over biodiesel production in Indonesia 
and other countries helped drive crude 
palm oil prices up more than 80 percent 
between mid-2006 and mid-2007. In 
2005 fats and oils comprised 3 percent 
of the household budget for the poorest 
quartile of the Indonesian population. 
This share had been falling with rising 
incomes, but it is now rising again due 
to the crude palm oil price spikes.41 In 
response to social unrest over higher 
cooking oil prices, the federal govern-
ment has increased the export tax on 
palm oil from 1.5 percent to 6.5 percent 
and is considering a proposal to require 
that 3.3 million metric tons (minimum) 
of palm oil be sold for domestic use. 
Blending mandates have also fallen 
from 5 percent to 2.5 percent.42 The 
impacts of higher palm oil prices on 
future biodiesel investments, the avail-
ability of food-based oils in the global 
market, and fat intake by the world’s 
poorest consumers remain uncertain. It 
is clear, however, that biofuels growth is 
already transforming the global vegetable 
oils sector.
Table 1. Predictions of price changes under various biofuels-related scenarios
Source Scenario Projected price increase
M. W. Rosegrant, S. Msangi, T. Sulser, and 
R. Valmonte-Santos, Biofuels and the Global 
Food Balance (Washington, DC: International 
Food Policy Research Institute, 2006).
4 percent U.S. gasoline replacement by biofu-
els, 20 percent elsewhere, up to 58 percent in 
Brazil (biodiesel in EU, ethanol elsewhere); no 
technology improvement, projected to 2020.
Corn, 41 percent; wheat, 30 percent; soy 
(oilseeds) 76 percent; sugar (sugarcane), 
66 percent; cassava, 135 percent
Same as above, but with cellulosic technology 
online by 2015, and crop productivity improve-
ments, projected to 2020.
Corn, 23 percent; wheat, 16 percent; soy 
(oilseeds) 43 percent; sugar (sugarcane), 
43 percent; cassava, 54 percent
M. Von Lampe, Agricultural Market Impacts of 
Future Growth in the Production of Biofuels 
(Paris: Working Party on Agricultural Policies 
and Markets, AGR/CA/APM(2005)24/FINAL, 
Committee on Agriculture, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2006).
Constant $60 per barrel price of oil, projected 
to 2014.
Corn, 19 percent; wheat, 17 percent; soy 
(oilseeds) 19 percent; sugar, 20 percent; 
vegetable oil, 22.3 percent
“Growth in line with publicly stated goals”; 28 
gigaliters in the United States by 2012, pro-
jected to 2014.
Corn, 2.5 percent; wheat 4.4 percent; soy 
(oilseeds) 1.1 percent; sugar, 4 percent;  
vegetable oil, 12.9 percent
Food and Agricultural Policy Research  
Institute (FAPRI), Implications of Increased 
Ethanol Production for U.S. Agriculture 
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri,  
FAPRI-UMC Report #10-05 2005)
7 billion gallon U.S.-produced ethanol use, 7.5 
billion gallon biodiesel and ethanol imports by 
2012, projected from 2012 to 2015, relative to 
baseline.
Corn, 5.4 percent; wheat, 1.7 percent; soy, 
-0.2 percent; sorghum, 4.2 percent
A. Elobeid, and S. Tokgoz, Removal of U.S. 
Ethanol Domestic and Trade Distortions: 
Impact on U.S. and Brazilian Ethanol Markets 
(CARD Working Paper 06-WP 427, Center 
for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa 
State University, 2006).
Long-run oil price of $60 per barrel with the 
United States using 30 billion gallons of etha-
nol, projected to 2015, relative to baseline.
Corn, 58 percent; wheat, 20 percent; soy 
(meal) -42 percent; soy (oil) 20 percent
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Baseline Projections: U.S. Crops, 2007–
2016, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/
Baseline/crops.htm.
12 billion gallons of ethanol, 700 million gal-
lons of biodiesel in the United States, pro-
jected to 2016. 
Corn, 65 percent; wheat, 33 percent; soy, 
19 percent; sugar, -8 percent; sorghum, 64 
percent
J. N. Ferris and S. V. Joshi, “An Econometric 
Analysis of the Impact of the Expansion in the 
U.S. Production of Ethanol from Maize and 
Biodiesel from Soybeans on Major Agricultural 
Variables, 2005-2015,” in J. Outlaw, K. J. Col-
lins, and J. A. Duffield eds., Agriculture as a 
Producer and Consumer of Energy (Cam-
bridge, MA: CABI Publishing, 2006).
5.7 billion gallons of ethanol, 300 million gal-
lons of biodiesel in the United States by 2015, 
projected relative to baseline. 
Corn, 6 percent; soy (meal), -5 percent; soy 
(oil), 31 percent
FAPRI, Baseline Update for U.S. Agricultural 
Markets (Columbia, MO: University of Mis-
souri, FAPRI-UMC Report #12-06 2006).
6.6 billion gallons ethanol in Brazil, 0.8 bil-
lion gallons ethanol in EU, 8 billion gallons in 
United States; 4.9 mmt rapeseed oil in EU, 
projected to 2015–2016, relative to today.
Corn, 30 percent; wheat, 11 percent;  
soy, 2 percent; sugar, 21 percent  
(FOB Caribbean); palm oil, 17 percent
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Food Security Implications
The above case studies indicate that 
biofuels are causing an abrupt increase in 
demand for agricultural commodities tra-
ditionally used for food and feed, which 
is placing upward pressure on crop prices. 
Whether future price increases and subse-
quent adjustments in demand and supply 
occur at local, regional, or global scales 
has yet to be determined. Price transmis-
sion models developed for agricultural 
trade policy analysis provide some indi-
cation of scale; for example, some such 
models suggest strong national and global 
price transmission for maize and cassava 
with the exception of some very low-
income landlocked countries. 43
There are also a number of studies 
completed and in progress that project 
future agricultural prices related to bio-
fuels development. Table 1 on page 40 
summarizes the price forecasts for several 
of these studies. Although they are not 
directly comparable to one another given 
differences in model design, scope, and 
time horizon, they offer a glimpse at where 
prices might move under various scenarios 
of biofuels expansion. These studies gen-
erally anticipate large increases in cas-
sava prices, moderate to large increases in 
maize prices, slightly smaller increases in 
wheat prices, small to large increases in 
sugar prices, moderate increases in veg-
etable and palm oil prices, and ambiguous 
effects on soybean prices as meal and oil 
prices move in opposite directions. Unfor-
tunately, these models do not project direct 
transmission from the international market 
to particular countries.
In addition to the anticipated price 
increases for virtually all commodities, 
three other conclusions seem clear from 
Table 1. First, the variance in price pre-
dictions tends to swamp the mean. Sec-
ond, price variability is not treated in 
most models. And finally, the focus of 
most projections is on a limited number 
of scenarios surrounding industrial-world 
production. Few studies attempt to quan-
tify the various linkages between biofuels 
development and food-insecure people in 
low-income countries. As a first cut, some 
studies have inferred the potential link-
ages by dividing countries among food 
and energy importers and exporters by 
income group, but this approach does not 
embed the dynamics of rural development 
that might result from higher agricultural 
prices.44 Extensive analytical work based 
on global and national data sets and inte-
grated dynamic models is needed to quan-
tify these linkages more precisely.
Understanding what poor people eat and 
how they spend their money on food pro-
vides additional insight into the potential 
food security consequences of biofuels 
growth. When crops are ranked accord-
ing to their contribution to average calorie 
consumption by the world’s food-insecure 
population, the main feedstocks appear 
near the top of the list. Sug-
arcane, maize, cassava, palm 
oil, soy, and sorghum comprise 
about 30 percent of mean calorie 
consumption by people living in 
chronic hunger.45
In some countries, such as 
Guatemala, Malawi, and Tan-
zania—all countries with high 
rates of malnutrition—people 
derive one-third or more of 
their calories from maize.46 The 
poorest segments of these popu-
lations are particularly vulner-
able to increasing maize prices. 
For example, World Bank sur-
vey data from Tanzania indicate 
that the poorest quintile spend 
five times as much on maize 
compared to the richest as a percent of total 
expenditure, and roughly twice the mean.47 
The same data also show that the poorest 
spend 80 percent of their budget on food, 
as opposed to 60 percent for the richest.
Other key commodities in the biofuels 
market are also important in the diets 
of the poor. Cassava accounts for one-
third and one-half of calories consumed 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Ghana, respectively, and sugar accounts 
for a strikingly high share of calories con-
sumed in Brazil, Bolivia, and Guatemala. 
Palm oil does not represent a particularly 
large share of total calories consumed in 
poor countries, but it does account for 
a large share of the fats consumed. For 
example, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, two 
of the poorest countries in the world, palm 
oil accounts for 40 percent of the fats con-
sumed on average, and in Bangladesh and 
Kenya, the rate is 20 percent.48
If agricultural commodity prices remain 
high, the amount of humanitarian food aid 
available for extremely poor countries is 
also likely to be affected. Food aid ship-
ments from the United States are inversely 
correlated with commodity prices; that is, 
when cereal prices are high—and when 
poor consumers are apt to need aid the 
most—food aid shipments are low, and 
vice versa.49 In the short run, a sharp 
decline in food aid shipments could severe-
ly impact those in need. In Malawi and 
Zimbabwe, about one-fifth of total coarse 
grain consumption comes from food aid; 
in Guatemala the share is one-tenth. Food 
aid is seldom a long-run solution to chronic 
hunger, and perhaps with higher commodi-
ty prices, there will be greater incentives to 
invest in agricultural development in poor 
countries. The impact of humanitarian aid 
is likely to be most acute in the short run as 
adjustments are being made.
One of the greatest uncertainties regard-
ing the ripple effects of biofuels growth 
on global food security is, indeed, how 
agricultural development patterns will 
respond to rising prices in international 
markets. Will cassava production expand 
in extremely poor countries like Laos and 
Cambodia in response to China’s demand 
and lift rural households out of pover-
Biodiesels may be the wave of the future, but at what 
cost to food security?
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ty? Will low-income maize producers in 
southern and eastern Africa find richer 
domestic markets for their crops with the 
decline in U.S. food aid? Will there be a 
revival of agricultural investments in low-
income food deficit countries where policy 
attention has turned elsewhere in recent 
decades? These questions are not easy to 
answer at this early stage of the biofuels 
revolution and will depend on economic 
incentives as well as governance in the 
world’s poorest countries.
Conclusions and Policy 
Implications
As 2007 draws to a close with the 
biofuels boom in play, four conclusions 
seem clear. First, rapid growth in the bio-
ethanol and biodiesel markets is placing 
increasing demands on key agricultural 
commodities that have traditionally been 
used for food and feeds. As a result, 
agricultural commodity prices for the 
main feedstocks are rising in international 
markets, inducing substitutions in produc-
tion and consumption that are causing 
price increases in a wider array of agri-
cultural markets. It is very likely that the 
demand for biofuels and related effects 
on agricultural prices will continue as 
long as petroleum prices remain above 
$55–60 per barrel. A second, related 
point is that political economy interests 
in some important countries and regions 
such as the United States, China, Brazil, 
Indonesia, and the European Union will 
likely perpetuate growth in biofuels pro-
duction capacity over the medium term 
regardless of short-run fluctuations in 
petroleum prices. Such interests include 
goals to revitalize rural economies, sup-
port agricultural constituencies, generate 
foreign investment and foreign exchange 
reserves, and create globally competitive 
biofuels industries in the face of multiple 
incentives to reduce fossil fuel use. Hence 
even if petroleum prices fall, demands 
on the global agricultural sector will 
remain strong.
Third, the leading agricultural commod-
ities used as feedstocks, such as sugarcane, 
maize, oil palm, and cassava, are also those 
that comprise a relatively large share of the 
diets of food-insecure people worldwide. 
Although most poor people live in rural 
areas and are dependent on agriculture, the 
world’s food-insecure population is com-
prised mainly of net consumers. The global 
food security implications and tradeoffs of 
biofuels development thus deserve serious 
policy attention.
Finally, biofuels growth will rely pri-
marily on agricultural commodities as 
opposed to cellulosic feedstocks over the 
coming decade and will be constrained 
largely by food crop production capacity. 
Agricultural land area is limited in most 
regions, and where expansion is pos-
sible (for example, Brazil and Indonesia), 
the environmental costs related to forest 
clearing, GHG emissions, biodiversity 
loss, hydrological changes, and reduced 
water and soil quality could potentially 
offset the benefits from biofuels. In land- 
constrained regions, raising yields through 
ad hoc use of higher fertilizer rates and 
water resources without improved tech-
nologies to increase input efficiencies 
also creates environmental problems.50 
The extent to which biofuels growth is 
compatible with sustainable development 
therefore remains questionable without 
a substantial increase in research that 
explicitly targets environmentally sound 
practices for producing crop-based feed-
stocks, at least until second-generation 
technologies become commercially via-
ble at a large scale. Even then, land con-
version to cellulosic feedstocks will have 
both positive and negative environmental 
impacts.
Several additional uncertainties related 
to the dynamics of the global economy 
loom large as the biofuels market unfolds. 
Will poor, small farmers in South Asia 
benefit from higher world prices? Will 
poor net consumers of cassava or maize 
in sub-Saharan Africa be affected by price 
increases caused by growth in the United 
States or Chinese bio-ethanol markets? 
Even today, the transmission of agricul-
tural commodity prices from the inter-
national to the local scale, particularly in 
low-income, food-deficit regions where 
the chronically hungry are most affected, is 
not clear. Moreover, it is not obvious what 
types of substitutions poor consumers are 
making or are likely to make in their diets 
with price increases in staple foods.
The wide array of potential interac-
tions over space and time in the world 
food economy requires policy analyses 
that are neither black box models nor 
simplistic partial equilibrium solutions. 
While these analyses are being pursued, 
continued efforts should be promoted to 
address food insecurity regionally and 
globally through agricultural investments 
in low-income countries, particularly 
where governance structures are adequate 
to permit broadly distributed rural growth. 
It is likely that aggregate investments in 
agricultural development at the national 
or regional level will be more successful 
in reducing rural poverty than individual 
biofuels investments by specific compa-
nies or groups—the latter often resulting 
in a silver bullet approach with limited 
reach to poor populations.
Growth in biofuels production capac-
ity offers many promises, but also many 
threats, for the future course of sustainable 
development. The design and implementa-
tion of sustainability audits is critical as 
the biofuels industry develops, with clear 
metrics for evaluating the environmental 
and social consequences of biofuels and 
feedstock production and for ensuring that 
management and governance practices are 
compatible with pre-determined sustain-
ability goals. The Roundtable on Sustain-
able Palm Oil provides a good model for 
such an audit process and is now being 
used to reevaluate a large proposed U.S. 
investment in a palm oil–based biodiesel 
plant.51 The European Union is also in 
the process of creating a set of biofuels 
sustainability criteria that will be applied 
to domestic production and imports in its 
efforts to reach its 10 percent target by 
2020.52 It is important that these efforts 
remain true to sustainability objectives 
and are not used as trade barriers to protect 
domestic agricultural markets. Integrat-
ing the results of sustainability audits 
with analyses of food security impacts of 
biofuels expansion would provide useful 
input to policymakers, foundations and 
private companies investing in biofuels 
activities, and international agencies seek-
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ing to reduce global poverty and hunger. 
In defense of the world’s poorest popula-
tions, it is urgent that the ripple effects of 
crop-based biofuels on food security and 
the environmental be understood soon 
and considered carefully in the design of 
development policies and investments.
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